This paper studies a principal-agent relation in which the principal's private information about the agent's effort choice is more accurate than a noisy public performance measure. For some contingencies the optimal contract has to specify ex post inefficiencies in the form of inefficient termination (firing the agent) or third-party payments (money burning). We show that money burning is the less efficient incentive device: it is used at most in addition to firing and only if the loss from termination is small. Under an optimal contract the agent's wage may depend only on the principal's report and not on the public signal. Nonetheless, public information is valuable as it facilitates truthful subjective evaluation by the principal.
Introduction
In the textbook moral hazard problem, the agent chooses some unobservable effort, and the only information about his success is some noisy but objective performance measure which is verifiable by outsiders. As Prendergast (1999) has pointed out, however, most people do not work in jobs like these. Rather, many firms use subjective performance evaluations.
This paper studies subjective performance evaluation in a contracting problem between a risk-neutral principal and one risk-neutral agent with limited liability. The principal may use a publicly verifiable but noisy objective performance signal to provide effort incentives for the agent. But, he privately receives more accurate information about the output produced by the agent. This information is not observable by outsiders and in this sense 'subjective'. We show that the optimal contract always relies not only on the public performance measure but also on subjective evaluation by the principal. Therefore, it has to address two incentive problems. On the one hand, the agent must be given incentives to exert effort. On the other hand, the principal has to be incentivized to report his information truthfully: giving a bad performance evaluation must be costly for the principal if the performance is in fact good; otherwise, the principal would be tempted to report bad performance to save on wage costs. Thus some ex-post inefficiencies are unavoidable.
The literature has studied two different solutions to the incentive problem of truthful subjective evaluation. First, Kahn and Huberman (1988) study up-or-out contracts in a dynamic setting where in an initial period the agent should acquire some firm specific human capital. The agent chooses an effort to learn, and then the principal privately receives information about the agent's success. In the optimal contract, the principal commits ex ante either to promote the agent and pay a high wage, or else to end the relationship by firing the agent. The principal is prevented from giving a bad performance evaluation when the agent was successful by his commitment to fire upon a bad performance evaluation. There is an ex post inefficiency, however, since the agent is fired after a bad evaluation, even if it would be ex post optimal to keep him.
Second, MacLeod (2003) allows for payments to third parties ("money burning").
Here the principal commits to pay out the same amount of money, irrespective of the performance evaluation, but the agent receives only a part of this payment when the evaluation is bad, while the remaining part is paid to a third party. The principal thus has no incentive to give bad evaluations to safe costs. Again, this involves an ex post inefficiency, which here takes the form of money burning.
While terminations of economic relationships are frequently observed in practice, examples for third-party payments are rather hard to come by.
1 Our paper provides an eco-1 Besides the obvious examples of layoffs and dismissals, option contracts where one party keeps the authority to terminate the relationship are a case in point. See Lerner and Malmendier (2010) on the use of nomic explanation of why firing is more frequently observed than money burning. One might think that money burning and firing share essentially the same properties; indeed MacLeod (2003) motivates money burning as a shortcut for protracted conflict within an organization or the termination of a valuable work relationship. We argue, however, that money burning and firing have subtly different implications for the incentives of the principal: The principal's cost of burning one dollar does not depend on the agent's success or failure, but the principal's cost from firing the agent often depends on how successful the agent was. This is the case for up-or-our contracts as in Kahn and Huberman (1988) , where a success of the agent means that the agent has acquired human capital valuable for the firm. Similarly, Schmitz (2002) studies a buyer-seller relationship where the seller (agent) produces a good, the quality of which depends on the seller's effort, but only the buyer (principal) knows his true willingness to pay for the good. Here 'firing' corresponds to the buyer not buying the good after it has been produced, and the principal's loss from not buying the good depends on the realized quality of the good.
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To capture the dependence of the principal's cost of firing on the agent's success in straightforward manner, we assume that upon firing the principal loses a fraction α of the output produced by the agent. We show that, under this assumption, firing is the more cost-effective instrument, and the principal will prefer firing over money burning. Since the costs of firing are high when the agent was in fact successful, a commitment to fire the agent after a bad performance evaluation gives the principal strong incentives to report successes truthfully. Moreover, the costs of this commitment are relatively low, since on the equilibrium path the principal will give a bad report only if the agent was, after all, not successful, and hence firing him is not that costly for the principal.
3 Only a bounded amount of incentives, however, can be generated with firing. When α is small, the principal cannot be given strong incentives for truthful revelation of his information, since he will not lose much after firing the agent. Thus, money burning can occur under the optimal contract, but only as a secondary instrument in addition to firing the agent.
We also provide several insights into the interaction between subjective and objective performance evaluation. If the principal receives his private information before the less informative public signal becomes available, the agent's wage schedule is not uniquely option contracts in biotechnology research. An example of third party payments is given by Fuchs (2007) : some baseball teams can fine their players, and the fines are not paid to the club, but rather to a charity. 2 Bester and Krähmer (2012) consider a buyer-seller relation where the buyer observes the seller's quality choice, but his observation is not verifiable. They show that 'exit option' contracts, corresponding to the option of 'firing' in the present context, can implement the first-best. Here and in Schmitz (2002) this is not possible because the agent's (the seller's) effort is not directly observable. 3 Obviously, firing might inflict a cost on the agent, and the threat of firing may be used in to motivate the agent. The use of non-monetary fines to overcome limited liability has been studied in Chwe (1990) and Sherstyuk (2000) . To focus on the implications of firing versus money burning for the principal's incentives, we assume that firing imposes no costs at all on the agent.
determined. It can be chosen in such a way that wages are contingent exclusively on subjective evaluation and do not depend on the public performance measure. This does not mean, however, that public information is useless. Wile it is not directly used to incentivize the agent, it facilitates providing incentives for truthful subjective evaluation by the principal. We show that for this reason the principal's payoff is increasing in the precision of public information.
In contrast, if the principal's information arrives after the public signal, the agent's wage schedule is uniquely determined by the optimal contract and it necessarily depends on both types of performance measures. This is so because the principal in this case faces an ex post truthtelling constraint for each single realization of the public signal rather than an ex ante constraint in expectation of the public signal. Perhaps surprisingly, however, it turns out that for the principal's payoff it does not matter whether he receives his private information earlier or later than the realization of public information.
By the latter observation, the principal has no incentive to acquire information early on. But, we also discuss a slight extension of our model where the fraction of output lost due to project termination is increasing over time. Here the principal is strictly better off by delaying his report. When the timing of subjective evaluation can be selected by the principal, he will report when the fraction of output lost due to project termination is high enough such that no payments to third parties are necessary to solve the incentive problem of truthful subjective evaluation. This reinforces our argument that money burning is a less attractive instrument than firing the agent in contracting problems with subjective evaluations.
Related Literature
As described above, our paper contributes to the literature on optimal contracting with subjective evaluation by comparing the use of project termination with payments to third parties. From this literature, Schmitz (2002) and Khalil, Lawaree and Scott (2012) are most closely related to our paper. Schmitz (2001) allows the use of both project termination and money burning and assumes, as is natural in his buyer-seller setting, that the complete output produced by the agent (seller) is lost when the principal (buyer) terminates the relation. In his setting, the optimal contract never involves any money burning. Khalil, Lawaree and Scott (2012) study a related issue in an adverse selection model. In their model, the agent knows the productivity of his effort, and the principal receives some subjective information about the agent's type. If the principal receives his information before the agent chooses his effort, the optimal contract specifies an effort that depends on the agent's report about his type and on the principal's report. In particular, there is a rescaling of the project to a lower level of effort and wage if the agent reports a low productivity but the principal's signal indicates a high productivity. Khalil, Lawaree and Scott (2012) find that this rescaling is superior to money burning. There are several differences between their result and our comparison of firing versus money burning. First, rescaling as in Khalil, Lawaree and Scott (2012) presupposes that the principal receives his private information before the agent chooses his effort. Therefore the principal strictly prefers to receive his information early. In our moral hazard setting, the principal's private information is a signal about the effort chosen by the agent, and thus necessarily becomes available only after the effort has been chosen. Moreover, in our setting the principal has no incentive to acquire information early; in contrast, he will strictly prefer to acquire information late if the fraction of output lost upon firing is increasing over time. Second, rescaling works in Khalil, Lawaree and Scott (2012) since different types of the agent trade off producing output and receiving wages at different rates. In contrast, firing works in our model since the principal's expected cost from firing depends on his private signal. This has implications concerning the set of implementable contracts. In Khalil, Lawaree and Scott (2012) the principal's incentive constraints jointly imply that they hold with equality in every possible state, such that the principal will always be indifferent between his reports. As in MacLeod (2003) , this indifference of the principal is an implication of the principal's incentive constraints. In contrast, in our setting the principal's incentive constraints can all be fulfilled without the principal ever being indifferent between sending different reports. As in a standard adverse selection model, in the optimal contract the principal's incentive constraint after having received bad news is slack, while the principal's incentive constraint after having received favorable information is binding. The latter, however, is an implication of optimality of the contract, and not of implementability alone.
Two recent contributions on optimal contracting with subjective evaluation include Lang (2013) and Sonne and Sebald (2012) . In Lang (2013) the principal can justify subjective evaluation by sending a costly message. Sonne and Sebald (2012) consider a behavioral economics model in which unfair subjective evaluation by the principal induces a costly conflict with the agent. Similarly to money burning this may help the principal to truthfully commit to a higher wage.
Subjective evaluations have also been studied in models of repeated interactions, where intertemporal incentives for truthful revelation play a key role (e.g. Levin (2003) and Fuchs (2007) ). Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994) and Pearce and Stacchetti (1998) study the combination of subjective and objective performance measures in infinitely repeated interactions; the focus of these papers differ from ours since thy impose exogenous assumptions on the set of admissible contracts that imply that, in the stage game, the private information of the principal cannot be used. While their focus is on the provision of intertemporal incentives to solve the principal's incentive constraints, we study the optimal contract in a one-shot relation without any exogenous restrictions on the set of admissible contracts.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 uses the revelation principle to formulate the contract design problem. As a benchmark, we show in Section 4 that under unlimited liability, the principal can implement the first-best effort and extract the full surplus. Section 5 introduces limited liability of the agent and contains the core results of the paper, which are illustrated by an example in Section 6. Whereas the main part of the paper assumes that the principal reports his information before the public signal is realized, in Section 7 we show that the principal realizes the same payoff if he reports ex post, which implies that the principal has no incentive to acquire information early. Moreover, Section 7 also contains the extension of the model where the fraction of output lost upon firing is growing over time. Under this assumption, the principal will always report late enough such that no money burning is needed in the optimal contract. We summarize our results and discuss extensions in Section 8. Formal proofs are collected in an appendix.
The Model
There is one principal and one agent, who are both are risk-neutral. At some initial date the principal offers the agent an employment contract for a joint project. The agent's outside option payoff at the contracting stage is normalized to zero. After being employed, the agent chooses some effort e ∈ E ≡ [0, 1]. From this effort choice the principal receives at some future date the (expected) output or benefit x = x H with probability e and x = x L with probability 1 − e, where 0 < x L < x H . The agent's monetary equivalent of his disutility of effort is c (e) . His choice of effort is not observable, neither to outsiders nor to the principal. The principal pays the agent the (expected) wage w at the end of their contractual relationship.
After the agent has chosen e, the principal privately observes whether the output will be x L or x H . The principal's information and the realization of output are not publicly observable. The output or benefit received by the principal may, for example, represent the quality of a good or service whose private value is difficult to determine. 4 The output may also represent the cash-flow from a project, which may not be be verifiable. For instance, if the principal operates in several businesses it may be impossible to ascribe money-streams to a particular project. 5 But we assume that there is a imprecise public signal s ∈ s L , s H , which is observable by outsiders and therefore verifiable. The public signal is correct with probability σ ∈ (1/2, 1): if the output is x i the public signal is s i with probability σ > 1/2 and s j = s i with probability 1 − σ < 1/2. In the limit σ → 1 our 4 Cf. MacLeod (2003) and Schmitz (2002) . 5 Indeed, it is common in the literature to assume that cash-flow is non-observable (see e.g. Baker (1992), Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) , or Lewis and Sappington (1997) ).
setup becomes equivalent to the standard principal-agent setting, where output is publicly observed and not only by the principal.
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The principal can terminate cooperation with the agent after observing the expected output. If he dismisses the agent before the project is completed, he loses a fraction α ∈ (0, 1] of output. The parameter α indicates the extent to which the project is already completed at this stage. In a buyer-seller relation, for example, where the principal refuses to trade after the agent has finished production of a good, α = 1 as in Schmitz (2002) . The agent's gross payoff from being dismissed is equal to zero. The termination decision is observable and contractible. We allow for stochastic contracts and denote by θ ∈ [0, 1] the probability that the agent is fired.
The inefficiency of premature project termination may be used to provide incentives for information revelation and effort choice (cf. Kahn and Huberman (1988) ). A similar incentive device are fines paid to a third party (cf. MacLeod (2003)). Indeed, we permit non-negative payments to a third party as part of the contract and refer to such payments as 'money-burning', because they reduce the available surplus. Without loss of generality, we assume that only the principal makes payments to a third party and denote by b ≥ 0 the amount of 'money-burning'. 
Assumption (1) is sufficient to eliminate corner solutions for the agent's effort when the agent's enumeration is not restricted to be non-negative. For the analysis of the limited liability case, in which wages have to be non-negative, we assume in addition that
These conditions avoid corner solutions with zero effort under limited liability. In addition, the first condition in (2) guarantees that the second-order conditions for the principal's optimization problem are satisfied.
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The agent's utility is w − c (e), and the principal's utility is
If the agent's effort were contractible and in the absence of limited liability restrictions, it would be chosen to maximize the expected joint surplus
6 See e.g. Holmstrom (1979) , Grossmann and Hart (1983), and Sappington (1983) . 7 Whether the principal or the agent pays b plays no role because the wage payment can be adjusted accordingly. 8 Note that (1) and (2) hold for the specification c(e) = ke a /2 with k > x H − x L for all a > 2. If a = 2, the public signal has to be sufficiently precise so that
Contract is signed
Principal observes x and reportsx
Public signal s realizes 
thus determines the first-best effort levelẽ, and the first-best surplus is S(ẽ).
Contract Design
Whenever contracting parties observe new information during the course of their relation, optimal contract design stipulates that they publicly report their information (see Myerson (1986) ). Therefore, we consider contracts that require the principal to choose some verifiable message after observing the realization of output. By the Revelation Principle (Myerson (1979) ), it is sufficient to consider messages that enable the principal to report simply some outputx ∈ {x L ,x H }. Since the terms of the contract can be conditioned on the report, the principal's subjective evaluation of performance complements the objective performance measure provided by the public signal.
We first consider the case where the principal observes output and chooses a report before the public signal realizes. We discuss an alternative timing in Section 7. In Sections 4-6 the sequence of events is as follows: After a contract has been signed in stage t = 0, the agent chooses his effort e in stage t = 1. Then in stage t = 2 the principal observes the realization of output x ∈ x L , x H and reportsx ∈ x L ,x H . In stage t = 3 the contract is executed after the public signal s is observed. Figure 1 summarizes the sequence of events.
A contract specifies the wage, the probability of firing the agent before project completion, and the amount of money-burning contingent on the public signal s and the principal's reportx. Let θ i j denote the probability of firing when the public signal is s i and the principal's report isx j . Similarly, w i j is the wage and b i j represents money burning if the public signal is s i and the report isx j . Let
If the principal observes the output x L and reportsx j in stage 2, he receives the expected payoff
because the public signal in stage 3 is s L with probability σ and s H with probability 1 − σ. Analogously, if the output realization is x H , the principal's payoff is equal to
By the Revelation Principle, we can restrict ourselves to contracts that satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints
These constraints ensure that reporting truthfully is optimal for the principal. In what follows, we refer to the principal's incentive compatibility constraints in (8) as the ICP constraints. Since the principal reports truthfully in stage 2, his ex ante expected payoff at the contracting stage is
Truthful reporting by the principal also implies that the agent's expected wage is
if the principal observes x L , and
otherwise. Therefore, the agent's ex ante payoff is
at the contracting stage.
Since effort is not observable, the agent chooses e in stage 1 to maximize his expected payoff in (12). This implies that e is determined by the first order condition
This condition ensures that e maximizes U(γ, e) because U(γ, e) is strictly concave in e.
In what follows, we refer to the incentive compatibility condition for the agent's effort in (13) as the ICA constraint.
At the contracting stage, the principal proposes a contract γ that the agent can either accept or reject. As the agent's outside option payoff is zero, he accepts the contract if it satisfies his individual rationality constraint
In the following we refer to (14) as the IRA constraint.
Unlimited Liability Contracts
In this section, we briefly consider as a benchmark the optimal contract in the absence of non-negativity restrictions on the wage schedule w. Thus the agent is not protected by limited liability and he may face a penalty w i j < 0 for some realization (s i , x j ) of the public signal and output. In this situation the principal's problem is (8), (13), and (14)
because he has to satisfy the ICP, ICA, and IRA constraints.
As is well-known (see e.g. Harris and Raviv (1979) ), with a risk-neutral agent and without limited liability restrictions the principal is able to appropriate the first-best surplus by making the agent the residual claimant in the relationship. This can be done by ignoring the principal's information and conditioning the agent's wage exclusively on the public signal s. This explains the following observation: (15) . Then θ = b = 0 and the wages can be chosen such that γ ignores the principal's information:
Moreover, e is equal to the first-best effortẽ and the principal's payoff V (γ,ẽ) is equal to the first-best surplus S(ẽ).
Under unlimited liability, subjective evaluation by the principal plays no role, independently of the precision of the public signal.
10 Therefore, the principal actually has no incentive to supervise the agent to acquire information about the future realization of output. It is important for this result that negative wage payments are feasible, because the wage w L L = w LH in Proposition 1 is negative. Indeed, it tends to minus infinity in the limit σ → 1/2 where the public signal becomes uninformative.
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Limited Liability Contracts
We now turn to the more interesting case where the agent is protected by limited liability. Thus the principal has to obey the additional constraint that the agent's wage cannot be negative and so his problem becomes (8), (13), (14) and w ≥ 0.
In what follows, we analyze how the principal's subjective information affects the terms of the contract γ and the agent's effort e. Since the principal's information is more accurate than the public signal, the Informativeness Principle of Holmstrom (1979) suggests that his information should be used in determining the agent's pay. This principle, however, is not directly applicable in the present context because the principal's observation of performance is not publicly verifiable. Nonetheless, even though subjective evaluation is constrained by the ICP conditions, we will show that it will always be used in an optimal contract.
We begin with several lemmas that identify the binding constraints in problem (16).
Lemma 1 Let (γ, e) solve problem (16). Then
(a) the IRA constraint (14) is not binding;
Part (a) of Lemma 1 shows that agent's individual rationality constraint (14) is automatically satisfied. Because the agent could choose zero effort at zero cost and wages are non-negative by limited liability, his utility cannot become negative.
By part (b), the agent's wage payment can be positive only if the principal reports that output is high. The reason is that, if w H L or w L L were positive, the principal could decrease these payments while increasing b H L or b L L by the same amount. Thereby the agent's incentive constraint could be relaxed while all other constraints remain unaffected. Moreover, part (b) also implies that firing and money burning can occur only if output is low. This result is driven by the observation under part (d): the relevant principal's incentive constraint in (8) is that he should have no incentive to underreport output, i.e. to claim that output is low while it is in fact high. Lowering any of θ H H , b H H , θ LH or b LH makes underreporting less tempting for the principal, leaves the agent's incentive constraint unaffected, and increases the principal's payoff; therefore all these variables must be zero.
The argument for why b L L must be zero is a bit more involved since a positive b L L could in principle be used to deter the principal from underreporting. However, if b L L were positive, one could decrease it while simultaneously increasing b H L and thereby increase the principal's payoff. To see why, note that the effect of b L L on the principal's incentive to underreport is proportional to 1 − σ, i.e. the probability that the public signal is low, given that the true output is high. In contrast, the effect of b H L is proportional to the probability that the public signal is high, given that the true output is high, which is σ > 1 − σ. Therefore, b H L has a stronger deterrence effect for the principal than b L L . Moreover, b H L affects the principal's payoff less adversely than b L L , since b H L has to be paid only when output is low but the public signal is high (which occurs with probability (1 − e) (1 − σ)), whereas b L L has to be paid in the more likely event that output is low and the public signal is low as well (which occurs with probability (1 − e) σ).
The second statement in part (c), follows from a similar comparison of the effects of θ L L and θ H L , the only additional complication being that, since θ H L is a probability, it cannot be greater than one. Roughly speaking, the result means that one should first use
The first statement in part (c) concerns the case where the principal reports low output, but the public signal is high: there will be money burning only if the agent is also fired with probability one. Compared with firing, burning money is a less attractive way to deter the principal from underreporting. The reason is that, while burning one dollar always costs one dollar, firing is more costly if output is high. Using θ H L to deter underreporting has the advantage that firing occurs only when it is less costly since output is low, but the principal is deterred from underreporting in case of high output.
As in standard adverse selection problems, statement (d) shows that only the downward incentive constraint is binding for truthful reporting. Finally, by part (e) of Lemma 1 the agent's effort choice is related to the principal's cost of firing and money burning. Indeed, the principal can incentivise the agent by a positive wage for high output only if he is committed not to underreport. Therefore, it must be costly for him to claim low output. The following lemma gives more details on the structure of wages. 
Lemma 2 Let
The lemma allows the principal to set w H H = w LH = c (e) in an optimal contract. Since w H L = w L L by (17), this means that the agent's enumeration w can be chosen such that it depends only on the principal's report and not at all on the public signal.
Lemmas 1 and 2 substantially simplify the principal's problem. Only four of the principal's choice variables remain to be determined: effort e, firing probabilities θ H L and θ L L , and money burning b H L . Moreover, to give the principal incentives to reveal information truthfully, the instrument θ H L should be used first, and only if it is exhausted in the sense that θ H L = 1, the instruments θ L L or b H L should be used. Lemmas 1 and 2 do not, however, help to compare the latter two instruments. As we show in our next Lemma, their relative attractiveness turns out to depend on the precision of the public signal. Define the critical valueσ
Note that 1/2 <σ < 1.
Lemma 3 Let γ, e solve problem (16
Lemma 3 further simplifies our analysis of problem (16). By part (a), there will be no project termination if both output and the public signal are low and the public signal is sufficiently informative: θ L L is zero. It is then cheaper to deter the principal from underreporting by making him burn money, that is, by using the instrument b H L . In fact, if the public signal is sufficiently informative, using b H L is attractive for two reasons. First, there is only a small chance that the public signal is high when output is low; therefore also the likelihood that the principal actually has to pay b H L is low. Second, b H L is quite effective in deterring the principal from underreporting if the public signal is sufficiently informative: given that output is high, the public signal is likely to be high as well; thus if the principal underreports, he has to pay b H L with high probability. As long as σ >σ, these considerations outweigh the countervailing consideration (related to those mentioned in the discussion of Lemma 1) that burning money is less effective than firing since the deterrence effect of firing is proportional to x H while the actual costs are proportional to x L .
If σ <σ, however, these countervailing considerations make θ L L a more attractive instrument than b H L . Therefore, by part (b) of Lemma 3, if the public signal is not very informative, there is no money burning unless the agent is fired with probability one if the public signal correctly indicates low output.
Together with our previous findings, the following proposition characterizes the optimal contract for the case where the public signal is sufficiently precise.
Proposition 2 Let (γ, e) solve problem (16). Suppose that σ >σ. Then there exists a critical
In combination with Lemmas 1 and 2, Proposition 2 shows that as long as the public signal is sufficiently accurate, project termination and money burning occur if and only if the public signal conflicts with the principal's report that output is low. When this happens, the public signal of high output is actually incorrect because the principal always reports truthfully. But, to credibly overrule the public signal, the principal has to be committed to some action that reduces his payoff.
Proposition 2 also shows that project termination and money burning are clearly ranked as incentive devices for truthful reporting: Money burning occurs only as a secondary instrument when the probability of firing the agent cannot be further increased because it is already equal to one. Indeed, money burning is not used at all in an optimal contract if α ≥ᾱ, which means that the loss from terminating the project is relatively high.
Our next result shows that the properties of the optimal contract are similar, albeit slightly more complicated, in the case where the public signal is rather imprecise:
Proposition 3 Let (γ, e) solve problem (16). Suppose that σ <σ. There exists criticalᾱ
The main difference with Proposition 2 is that now the principal may have to fire the agent even if the public signal corroborates his report of low output. The reason is that the principal must be given additional incentives not to underreport if the public signal is relatively imprecise. But note that money burning never occurs if the public signal agrees with the principal's report of low output, because b L L = 0 by Lemma 1.
Again, the incentive devices for truthful evaluation are hierarchically ordered. After the principal states low output, money burning is optimal only if at the same time the project is terminated with certainty. This is the case if the loss of output from firing the agent is rather low as α <ᾱ 1 . For higher values of α the loss from project termination is sufficient to keep the principal from underreporting and so money burning is suboptimal. But also the termination probabilities θ L L and θ H L are ranked as θ L L can be positive only if θ H L = 1. Indeed, this happens for intermediate values of α in the interval ᾱ 1 ,ᾱ 2 . In contrast, if α >ᾱ 2 the principal has to fire the agent with positive probability only if the public signal s = s H provides no support for his evaluationx =x L .
Our final result in this section shows that the principal benefits from increases in the parameters σ and α.
Proposition 4 Let (γ, e) solve problem (16). Then the principal's payoff V (γ, e) is strictly increasing in σ. Moreover, ∂ V (γ, e)/∂ α > 0 over the range where θ H L = 1 in Propositions 2 and 3, and ∂
The direct effect of a more precise public signal is not that it allows providing stronger incentives for the agent's effort choice. Indeed, our conclusion from Lemma 2 shows that under an optimal contract the agent's enumeration can be chosen to be independent of the public signal. The reason that the principal gains from an increase in σ is that it relaxes his ICP constraints for truthful subjective evaluation. If the public signal becomes more accurate, it becomes easier to punish the principal for underreporting. As a consequence, the expected loss from money burning or project termination is reduced. For example, if σ >σ such losses occur by Proposition 2 only if the public signal s H is incorrect because the true output is x L . As σ increases, the likelihood of an incorrect signal decreases and therefore expected losses are reduced. In fact, in the limit σ → 1 the expected loss from money burning or project termination tends to zero.
At first sight it may look paradoxical that the principal gains if firing the agent generates a higher loss of output. But again the intuition is that this relaxes the ICP conditions. Whenever θ H L = 1, an increase in α makes the principal better off because this allows him to reduce the less effective incentive instruments b H L or θ L L . This argument no longer holds if for high values of α it becomes optimal to set θ H L < 1 and b H L = θ L L = 0. Then the principal simply keeps αθ H L constant and so the expected loss from firing the agent does not depend on α.
An Example
In this section we illustrate the solution of the principal's problem (16) 
Notice that σ >σ becauseσ ≈ 0.5645. Further, the first-best effort isẽ = 4/5.
By Lemma 1 we can ignore the IRA constraint (14) and the first of the two ICP constraints in (8). Since the optimal contract γ satisfies (17) and θ L L = 0 by Lemma 3 (a), the principal's ex ante payoff V (γ, e) simplifies for the specification in (21) to
Similarly, the second ICP constraint in (8) becomes
and the ICA constraint (13) reduces to
The principal's problem is therefore to choose e and (w H H , w LH , θ H L , b H L ) ≥ 0 to maximize his payoff in (22) subject to (23), (24), and θ H L ≤ 1.
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It is a bit tedious but straightforward to derive the solution of this optimization problem from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions: The critical valueᾱ mentioned Proposition 2 is given byᾱ = 7/33, and the solution
and e = min 3α
The wages w H H ≥ 0 and w LH ≥ 0 are determined by (24) together with the solution for the agent's effort e in (25) and (26) 
Interestingly, the agent's effort e is not a monotone function of α. It is decreasing over the interval [0,ᾱ), increasing over the interval [ᾱ, 1/4), and constant for α ≥ 1/4. This is so because, as stated in Lemma 1 (e), the agent's effort incentive is positively related to the principal's willingness to incur an efficiency loss after reporting low output. As long as b H L > 0, an increase in the cost of project termination makes it optimal for the principal to reduce the amount of money burning at a rate that requires also reducing the agent's effort. In contrast, over the range where we have a corner solution with b H L = 0 and θ H L = 1, the principal's cost of reporting low output necessarily increases with α and so he can provide stronger incentives for the agent. Finally, if θ H L < 1, the principal optimally adjusts to a higher value of the parameter α by keeping αθ H L constant. Thus the expected cost of project termination and, therefore, also the agent's effort are not changed.
The Timing of Evaluation
We now consider the alternative timing of events where the principal becomes informed about the output realization after the public signal is observed. This means the sequence of events in Figure 1 is reversed in stages t = 2 and t = 3. Whereas this does not affect the ICA and IRA constraints for the agent, the principal's ICP constraints have to be reformulated because at the reporting stage he already knows the public signal.
If the principal observes the output x L and reportsx j in stage 3, his payoff depends on whether in stage 2 the public signal has been s L or s H according to
Similarly, his payoffs after observing x H depend on the public signal and are equal to
The ICP constraints for truthful reporting in the four possible (x, s)-constellations therefore are
Obviously, in comparison with the previous ICP conditions in (8) these constraints are more restrictive: The principal now has to report truthfully ex post for each realization of the public signal, while under (8) this is required only ex ante in expectation. Therefore, whenever γ satisfies the ICP conditions in (29) it also satisfies these conditions in (8).
When the principal observes output after the realization of the public signal, his contracting problem becomes max (γ,e)∈Γ×E V (γ, e) subject to (29), (13), (14) and w ≥ 0.
The only difference between this problem and problem (16) in Section 5 is that the ex ante ICP constraints (8) are replaced by the ex post constraints (29).
It is easy to see that in the case of unlimited liability contracts, which we studied in Section 4, it does not matter for the principal whether he reports his evaluation before or after the realization of the public signal. This is so because by Proposition 1 he can appropriate the first-best surplus by setting b = θ = 0 and using a wage schedule that is independent of his evaluation. The same contract thus trivially satisfies also the ICP constraints for ex post reporting.
13 Perhaps more surprising is the following observation that also with limited liability the time at which the principal observes and reports output is irrelevant for his payoff. As Lemma 2 shows, the agent's enumeration is not uniquely determined by the solution of problem (16). This degree of freedom turns out to be sufficient for meeting also the more restrictive requirements for ex post truthful reporting. By (18) and (19), Proposition 5 implies that the agent's wages in the solution of problem (30) satisfy
The payments w H L and w L L are zero by (17). Thus the agent is never rewarded by a positive wage if the principal submits an unfavorable evaluationx L . If, however, he reportŝ x H the public signal becomes decisive because w H H > w LH by Propositions 2 and 3. In contrast with our findings for ex ante reporting, the agent's wage schedule now necessarily depends not only on the principal's report but also on the public signal.
In our analysis the timing of subjective evaluation by the principal is exogenous. But from Proposition 5 we can draw some immediate conclusions for environments in which the principal can decide at which stage he evaluates the agent. Since the timing is irrelevant for his payoff, the principal has no incentive to acquire information at an early stage. Indeed, a slight modification of our model leads to the conclusion that delaying his report can even increase his payoff. Suppose that the parameter α, which presents the degree of project completion, increases over time. Then we can conclude from Propositions 2-4 that the principal gains from postponing the agent's evaluation as long as α lies in the range where θ H L = 1. The optimal time of reporting occurs when α is sufficiently large so that θ H L < 1. Interestingly, then money burning is no longer needed to prevent underreporting by the principal. Thus, if the timing of evaluation can be freely selected, reporting low output requires the principal to terminate the project and dismiss the agent with a positive probability, but he is not forced to burn money in addition.
Conclusions
We have studied a principal-agent relation where the principal possesses more accurate information about the outcome of the agent's effort than a publicly verifiable performance measure. Despite being noisier than the principal's information, public information is helpful to reduce the ex post inefficiencies that are unavoidably associated with subjective evaluation. As long as the public performance measure is not too imprecise, such inefficiencies occur only if the principal's subjective evaluation is contradictory to the public signal. In general, the presence of public information relaxes the principal's incentive compatibility constraints for truthful subjective evaluation.
Our analysis further shows that there is a clear pecking-order of the instruments that can be used to support truthful subjective evaluation. We show that 'firing' the agent, thereby destroying some part of the output, is more efficient than 'burning money' in the form of payments to a passive third party. When the efficiency loss from firing is large enough, an optimal contract makes no use of money burning. Also, money burning is not optimal as long as there is a positive probability that the agent is not fired.
The problem of subjective performance evaluation consists of creating effort incentives for the agent and, at the same time, incentives for truthful reporting by the principal. This double incentive problem can be extended to a setting with more than one agent where the principal's private information is about some aggregate measure such as the sum or the mean of the efforts. As is standard in the literature on subjective evaluation, in our model the principal does not have to invest in information acquisition. An additional moral hazard problem occurs, however, if the principal's information acquisition is costly and not observable. How this problem interacts with the other two incentive problems of subjective evaluation may be an interesting subject of further research. 
Then by (13) the agent will choose the first-best effortẽ. In addition, by unlimited liability one can choose the wage w L L such that the agent's individual rationality constraint holds with equality:
This contract implements the first-best effortẽ. Moreover, the principal's payoff is equal to the first-best surplus S (ẽ) because the agent receives his outside option payoff. Obviously, the payoff of the principal cannot be higher; thus the contract considered here is optimal. Moreover, any optimal contract must implement the first-best effortẽ, for otherwise the principal's payoff must be lower than the first-best surplus S (ẽ) .
It remains to show that θ = b = 0 in any optimal contract. By assumption (1),ẽ ∈ (0, 1) . Since σ < 1, this implies that all four possible combinations of output and the public signal occur with positive possibility. Therefore, whenever θ = 0 or b = 0, total surplus is below the first-best surplus S (ẽ) , and hence the principal's payoff is below S (ẽ) as well.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1 (a) The agent's utility is
Since w ≥ 0 and c (0) = 0, U γ, 0 ≥ 0. Thus (14) is automatically satisfied.
(b) If γ, e solves problem (16), then obviously γ must maximize V (γ, e) subject to the constraints in (16) when e is treated as a fixed parameter. The latter is a linear optimization problem since V γ, e and all constraints are linear in γ, and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are both necessary and sufficient for a maximum.
Following a standard method, we temporarily ignore that γ has to satisfy the inequality (8), and show later that this constraint is automatically satisfied in the proof of part (d) below. Consider the Lagrangian
with λ ≥ 0. Note that µ > 0 as the agent's incentive constraint must be binding.
and
Suppose this constraint is not binding. Then θ H L must be strictly positive, since by limited liability the left hand side of (47) 
must hold with equality.
Since (47) is binding,
where the inequality follows from w LH ≥ 0. Subtracting the left hand side of (48) shows that
If θ L L = 0, this implies that (48) is satisfied. Similarly, if (48) is satisfied.
To complete the argument, we show that one cannot have that (1 − σ)
By the first equality in (41) this implies
where the second inequality holds if
(e) By part (b), the agent's incentive constraint (13) reduces to
Combining this with (47), which holds with equality as shown above, completes the proof. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Lemma 2
By the equality in (44) this implies
where the last inequality holds because σ <σ. Therefore, θ L L = 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
We substitute out all choice variable except e from the principal's problem, and then optimize with respect to e. By Lemma 1 (b) and equation (19), the principal's profit V e, γ equals
By Lemma 3, θ L L = 0 and hence by Lemma 1 (e),
There are two possible cases. First, suppose that σαx H ≥ c (e) . This is equivalent to e ≤ê, whereê ≡ c −1 σαx H . In this case, (58) 
Note that φ 1 (e) ≤ φ 2 (e) if and only if c (e) ≤ σαx H . Therefore, the principal's payoff as a function of e can be written as V (e) ≡ min φ 1 (e) , φ 2 (e) .
Proof of Proposition 5 Since (γ, e) solves problem (16), γ satisfies (17). This reduces the constraints in (29) to
Further, (18) and (19) imply
By (78) 
